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Comments 
The Old Bailment Doctrine: The 
Answer to Fourth Amendment 
Jurisprudence in the Digital Age 
Shane Gallant* 
INTRODUCTION 
In today’s digital world, private citizens are finding a certain 
level of satisfaction and reliability in all aspects of life.  From self-
driving automobiles to the newly integrated smart homes and 
cities—life could not be easier.  For example, Tara is a business 
executive who is always on the go.  To save time, she has outfitted 
her home with today’s most innovative technology.  She purchased 
an Amazon Echo that is powered by Amazon’s voice-activated 
assistant, Alexa.1  Tara uses this device to make purchases, place 
phone calls, send text messages, maintain her calendar, play music, 
and control the lights and home security system.2  However, Tara 
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Roger Williams University School of Law,
2020.  A special thank you to Professor Emily Sack for her guidance throughout 
the writing process.  To my wife, Tara, thank you so much for supporting me 
throughout my law school career. 
1. Ry Crist & Andrew Gebhart, Everything You Need to Know About the
Amazon Echo, CNET (Sept. 21, 2018, 10:49 AM), https://www.cnet.com/how-
to/amazon-echo-alexa-everything-you-need-to-know/ [https://perma.cc/4R7V-
ECJC]. 
2. Id.  In the United States, the Amazon Echo now features over 30,000
skills that help make everyday life easier.  Bret Kinsella, Amazon Alexa Skill 
Count Surpasses 30,000 in the U.S., VOICEBOT (Mar. 22, 2018, 4:57 PM), 
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likely does not know that each call, text, purchase, and request is 
stored and timestamped on Amazon’s cloud.3   
Today, lives are run through devices like cell phones, products 
such as the Amazon Echo, and social media platforms. 
Technological globalization has generated many legal questions, 
the most important of which deal with personal privacy.  Assume, 
for example, the government suspects Tara of a crime.  Through 
some quick investigating, the government determines that much of 
her personal information is stored on Amazon’s cloud because many 
of Tara’s electronic devices are connected to her Amazon Echo.  The 
issue is that many people do not understand the extent to which the 
government can obtain data stored on a company’s cloud service.  
The hard truth is that the government seldom needs a warrant to 
access one’s sensitive information stored with a third party,4 and 
those third parties will not always provide notice when the 
government is requesting said information.5   
Like most people, Tara does not think of the privacy 
implications of the digital age; she is just happy to live in an 
advanced society, especially after her father’s recent heart attack. 
Given advancements in medical technology, Tara’s father, Bill, is 
comfortable knowing that he has a new pacemaker that allows for 
real-time wireless monitoring, an implantable cardioverter 
defibrillator, and long-lasting battery life that automatically 
transmits its data straight to his physician.6  Bill’s physicians have 
https://voicebot.ai/2018/03/22/amazon-alexa-skill-count-surpasses-30000-u-s/ 
[https://perma.cc/9EEW-LHUE].  
3. See Russel Brandom, How Much Can Police Find Out from a
Murderer’s Echo?, THE VERGE (Jan. 26, 2017, 9:05 AM), 
https://www.theverge.com/2017/1/6/14189384/amazon-echo-murder-evidence-
surveillance-data [https://perma.cc/S9HZ-9JCB]. According to Amazon, 
“[C]loud storage is a cloud computing model that stores data on the Internet 
through a cloud computing provider who manages and operates data storage 
as a service.”  See Cloud Storage, AMAZON, https://aws.amazon.com/what-is-
cloud-storage/ [https://perma.cc/X9PV-4QZZ] (last visited Sept. 29, 2019).  
4. See Anne Pfeifle, Comment, Alexa, What Should We Do About Privacy?
Protecting Privacy for Users of Voice-Activated Devices, 93 WASH. L. REV. 421, 
430-31 (2018); see also infra Part IV.
5. See Pfeifle, supra note 4, at 431–32 (“Microsoft alleged that in a
twenty-month period, federal courts issued 3,250 secrecy orders to Microsoft 
alone to prevent it from communicating with customers about requests for 
data, and of those about two-thirds had no end date.”). 
6. Dave Fornell, New Pacemaker Technologies, DAIC (Feb. 13, 2018),
https://www.dicardiology.com/article/new-pacemaker-technologies [https:// 
118 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:116 
all the recorded data at their disposal to make adjustments to his 
treatment as needed, which Bill loves since he no longer needs to 
make multiple trips to his doctor for testing.  But, should Bill feel 
so comfortable?  Could the government simply subpoena or obtain 
a court order for Bill’s pacemaker information if they believed that 
he was connected to a crime?  Sadly, for Tara and Bill, the 
government can obtain Tara’s records from Amazon’s cloud service 
as well as the pacemaker records from Bill’s doctor through a court 
order or subpoena.7  As society advances into a new technological 
era, current laws will continue to lose their effect in protecting a 
citizen’s privacy rights.  
Society is quickly shifting from technology known as the 
Internet to the broader Internet of Things (IoT).8  “[T]he [IoT] is a 
concept of connecting any device (so long as it has an on/off switch) 
to the Internet and to other connected devices.”9  The IoT 
“connect[s] things and people—all of which collect and share data 
about the way they are used and about the environment around 
them.”10  This new shift in technology is a major cause of concern 
for private citizens because current privacy laws cannot keep pace 
with this ever-changing digital landscape—a landscape where it is 
conceivable that all of one’s information will pass through the IoT, 
and that information will not be protected under the Fourth 
Amendment.   
Although the legal system is trying to keep pace with the 
digital world, the system is reactionary and will always be behind 
the curve of technology.  Currently, the government is taking 
advantage of the privacy laws to the detriment of peoples’ privacy 
rights through its use of the third-party doctrine.  That is, when an 
individual willingly discloses information to a third-party, such as 
one providing banking information to his or her financial 
perma.cc/GVN6-WFR5] (explaining new advancements in pacemaker 
technology). 
7. See infra Section I.B., which provides the cases that formed the basis
for this Comment’s introductory hypothetical. 
8. Dalmacio V. Posadas, Jr., The Internet of Things: Abandoning the
Third-Party Doctrine and Protecting Data Encryption, 53 GONZ. L. REV. 89, 90
(2017).  
9. Jen Clark, What Is the Internet of Things, IBM: INTERNET OF THINGS
BLOG (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.ibm.com/blogs/internet-of-things/what-is-
the-iot/ [https://perma.cc/S3RQ-CZZB]. 
10. Id.
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institution, that individual loses his or her reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the material disclosed.11  Thus, courts will not provide 
Fourth Amendment protections if the government obtains 
information that is in the custody of a third party.12  To date, it is 
widely accepted that the third-party doctrine allows the 
government to access an individual’s personal information stored 
by digital data providers because that information is considered 
voluntarily provided.13  Accordingly, if current constitutional 
doctrines are not amended to protect citizens in the digital age, then 
it is conceivable that government officials will have unregulated 
access to an individual’s personal information that is stored, 
monitored, and analyzed by various companies, creating an all-
inclusive picture of any IoT user.   
This Comment will focus on providing a solution to protect 
citizens’ privacy in the digital age against unreasonable searches, 
while balancing the government’s interest in obtaining evidence for 
criminal and civil litigation.  Specifically, Part I will provide a 
background into the IoT and its future development in our society. 
Part II will discuss traditional Fourth Amendment analysis, 
explaining what constitutes a Fourth Amendment search, and thus, 
what is protected by the Constitution.  Part III will discuss the 
history of the third-party doctrine and how its current 
interpretation is ill-suited for a technological society.  Part IV will 
provide an analysis of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in the 
digital age, discussing two key Supreme Court decisions that 
highlight the dangers of the third-party doctrine and current 
privacy law as it relates to technology.  Part V will provide a 
description of the Stored Communications Act (SCA) given that the 
government is using this statute as a way of circumventing a 
citizen’s Fourth Amendment protections.  Part VI will discuss the 
Supreme Court’s attempt to limit the third-party doctrine as it 
pertains to historical cell-site location information (CSLI) in 
Carpenter v. United States.14  Lastly, Part VII draws from Justice 
Gorsuch’s dissenting opinion in Carpenter15 and proposes the 
11. See Posadas, supra note 8, at 102.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
15. Id. at 2261–72 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
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creation of the “adhesion bailment” doctrine as a solution for saving 
the Fourth Amendment from the third-party doctrine in the digital 
age.   
I. THE INTERNET OF THINGS
The IoT can be defined as a global platform that connects 
sensors to objects, providing those objects with the ability to 
communicate with one another via the internet.16  For example, in 
Philadelphia, self-reporting trash compactors feature sensors that 
alert the compactor to compact the trash as it reaches a certain 
level, and connects to the Philadelphia Streets Department 
providing data on how full its compactors are, whether they need to 
be emptied, and whether maintenance or repair is required.17  IoT 
technology provides data processing, storage, and analysis all in 
real-time applications.18  Two of the largest implementations of IoT 
technology are found in the creation of the smart home and the 
smart city. 
A. The Integration of the Smart Home and City
The smart home is not the wave of the future.  It is already
here, given that just about all of the technology found in one’s living 
space has a smart home alternative.19  A smart home is a residence 
that uses internet-connected devices to manage and monitor 
everyday living and use of one’s home.20  Devices like thermostats, 
televisions, locks, garage door openers, and security systems are 
just a few of the devices that can interconnect with a home’s 
16. See Clark, supra note 9.
17. Stéphane Bourgeois, The Internet of Things in Real Life: 6 IoT
Examples, BELDEN: EMERGING TECH. & APPLICATIONS BLOG (June 9, 2017) 
https://www.belden.com/blog/smart-building/the-internet-of-things-in-real-
life-6-iot-examples [https://perma.cc/9VCR-FQPM]. 
18. Posadas, supra note 8, at 93 (citing Leon Hounshell, Forecasting




19. Margaret Rouse, Cutting Edge: IT’s Guide to Edge Data Centers, IOT 
AGENDA, https://internetofthingsagenda.techtarget.com/definition/smart-home 
-or-building [https://perma.cc/RZ8W-KSXC] (last visited Sept. 27, 2019).
20. Id.
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wireless network making life more efficient.21  Although these 
devices make life easier, they also store, compile, and analyze each 
and every moment of one’s day.22  
Just as technology companies are streamlining the home with 
digital technology, local governments have also begun 
implementing IoT technology into its cities.23  For example, in 2018, 
Columbus, Ohio, implemented a connected vehicle system that 
alerts drivers about related driving behavior patterns in their 
respective driving areas, and alerts drivers to all objects 
surrounding the vehicle.24  This system will eventually provide 
drivers, specifically first responders, with enhanced accident 
reports and real-time data regarding high-traffic areas—all geared 
toward improving citizen safety.25   
The technological advances of society are creating a vast world 
that makes life easier, more manageable, and safer.  However, as 
the IoT continues to develop, the risk of losing Fourth Amendment 
protections will continue to increase. For instance, the 
hypotheticals in this Comment’s Introduction were not provided to 
illustrate what will eventually happen—they are situations that 
have already taken place, as demonstrated in the two cases below.  
21. See id.  For an illustration of how smart home technology provides for
a more efficient life, consider the following example: 
Imagine you wake up at 7am every day to go to work.  Your alarm 
clock does the job of waking you just fine.  That is, until something 
goes wrong.  Your train’s cancelled and you have to drive to work 
instead.  The only problem is that it takes longer to drive, and you 
would have needed to get up at 6:45am to avoid being late.  Oh, and 
it’s pouring with rain, so you’ll need to drive slower than usual.  A 
connected or IoT-enabled alarm clock would reset itself based on all 
these factors, to ensure you got to work on time.  It could recognize 
that your usual train is cancelled, calculate the driving distance and 
travel time for your alternative route to work, check the weather and 
factor in slower travelling speed because of heavy rain, and calculate 
when it needs to wake you up so you’re not late.  If it’s super-smart, 
[it] might even sync with your IoT-enabled coffee maker, to ensure 
your morning caffeine’s ready to go when you get up. 
Clark, supra note 9. 
22. Posadas, supra note 8, at 97–98.
23. See id. at 97.
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B. Cases Illustrating a Decreased Expectation of Privacy in the
Digital Age
In 2017, Timothy Verrill was charged with murdering 
Christine Sullivan and Jenna Pellegrini in Ms. Sullivan’s New 
Hampshire home.26  New Hampshire prosecutors believed that an 
Amazon Echo which belonged to the victim contained evidence of 
the murders.27  The judge overseeing Verrill’s trial issued a court 
order directing Amazon to produce records created between 
January 27 and January 29, 2017, under a theory that the Amazon 
Echo may have activated and thus recorded the victims’ final 
moments.28  
In 2016, Ross Compton was suspected and later indicted on 
felony charges of aggravated arson and insurance fraud for 
allegedly starting a fire in his Middletown, Ohio home, based in 
part on evidence found on his pacemaker.29  The government used 
the data found on Compton’s pacemaker to prove that he was not 
physically capable of performing the tasks he claimed to have 
accomplished during the night of the fire.30  Police obtained a 
search warrant for data recorded on the pacemaker and, after 
medical technicians downloaded the data revealing heart rate and 
cardiac rhythms before, during, and after the fire, the police 
subpoenaed and ultimately obtained the data.31   
26. Kimberly Haas, Murder Victims’ Families Upset They Weren’t Warned






29. Lauren Pack, Arson Suspect in Unique Case Featuring Pacemaker
Data is Back in Custody, JOURNAL-NEWS (July 24, 2018) https://www.journal-
news.com/news/arson-suspect-unique-case-featuring-pacemaker-data-back-
custody/dn6JyzsOemZovpayJMZLNJ/ [https://perma.cc/DRK5-SAGG]. 
30. See id.  Mr. Compton claimed that when he awoke from the fire, he
packed his belongings in multiple bags, grabbed his computer and medical 
device charger, broke a window with his cane, and threw his luggage out of it 
before abandoning his home.  Deanna Paul, Your Own Pacemaker Can Now 
Testify Against You in Court, WIRED (July 29, 2017, 7:00 AM), 
https://www.wired.com/story/your-own-pacemaker-can-now-testify-against-
you-in-court/ [https://perma.cc/TP7R-JG8Q]. 
31. Paul, supra note 30.
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The cases presented above illustrate how stored data that is 
transmitted through digitally connected devices provide the 
government a way of accessing personal information without the 
need for a warrant.  The government is simply obtaining a subpoena 
or court order for the data that was transmitted and now stored 
with a third-party. The development of stronger connectivity, 
intelligence, and convenience functions on digital devices creates a 
greater risk of private data being exposed to the outside world.32  
Stephanie Lacambra, the Electronic Frontier Foundation’s criminal 
defense attorney, sums up Compton’s case, and the disturbing truth 
of the digital world: 
The reality is that we are no longer the sole proprietors or 
controllers of our personal information . . . .  For people 
worried about being monitored in that way, this ruling is 
chilling. If Compton didn’t want doctors and law 
enforcement to have access to his heartbeat, what 
alternative did he have—decide against getting a 
pacemaker?33 
Using the newest innovative technological gadgets leaves 
citizens and their property vulnerable to third-party technology 
providers. With the implementation of smart homes and cities, 
citizens will have no choice but to share their information with third 
parties, forcing private citizens to integrate into the IoT. 
Accordingly, the duty to protect an individual’s privacy is 
incumbent upon citizens, legislators, and the courts to ensure that 
the Fourth Amendment remains intact and continues to protect the 
nation’s citizens from unlawful searches.  To accomplish this goal, 
legislatures must modify current laws so the government cannot 
compel technology companies to provide access to stored data,34 and 
courts should reevaluate the third-party doctrine in the digital 
age.35  One must first understand the history of Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, as described in the next section, in 
order to see the extent of the concerns raised by the IoT and the 
32. See id.
33. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
34. See infra Part V.
35. See infra Part III.
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third-party doctrine and appreciate the need for enhanced privacy 
rights in a technological society.   
II. TRADITIONAL FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.”36  As illustrated in United 
States v. Jones, there are currently two approaches courts use to 
analyze whether the government conducted a Fourth Amendment 
search.37  The first approach, developed in Olmstead v. United 
States, is known as the physical trespass test.38  If the government 
physically trespasses on an individual’s constitutionally protected 
property for the purpose of obtaining information, courts will 
generally conclude that a Fourth Amendment search occurred.39  
Under the second approach, outlined in Justice Harlan’s 
concurrence in Katz v. United States, courts will likely conclude that 
a Fourth Amendment search took place if the government violates 
an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy.40  The Katz test 
has two requirements: first, the individual must display a 
subjective expectation of privacy, and second, that expectation must 
be one that society is willing to recognize as reasonable.41 
Originally, the Court in Katz appeared to replace the physical 
trespass test created in Olmstead v. United States.42  The Jones 
Court made it clear, however, that Justice Harlan’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy analysis in Katz did not extinguish the 
“physical trespass” rule: “The Katz reasonable-expectations test 
‘has been added to, not substituted for,’ the traditional property-
based understanding of the Fourth Amendment . . . .”43  Although 
courts still utilize the physical trespass test, Fourth Amendment 
36. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
37. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 411 (2012).
38. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464–66 (1928).
39. See id. (holding that wiretapping did not amount to search within
meaning of Fourth Amendment because there was no actual physical invasion 
of defendant’s house or curtilage for purpose of making seizure). 
40. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring). 
41. Id.
42. Id. at 353 (majority opinion).
43. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 11 (2013) (quoting United States v.
Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 409 (1928)). 
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search analysis is generally conducted using the far murkier 
reasonable expectation of privacy test created in Katz.44 
Accordingly, an individual may be entitled to Fourth 
Amendment protection of “what he seeks to preserve as private, 
even in an area accessible to the public.”45  Therefore, Fourth 
Amendment protection does not necessarily depend on the material 
sought, but rather on the relationship the individual creates with 
the information and his surroundings that give rise to an 
expectation of privacy.46  This premise was first illustrated in Katz: 
The Government stresses the fact that the telephone booth 
from which the petitioner made his calls was constructed 
partly of glass, so that he was as visible after he entered it 
as he would have been if he had remained outside. But 
what he sought to exclude when he entered the booth was 
not the intruding eye—it was the uninvited ear.  He did not 
shed his right to do so simply because he made his calls 
from a place where he might be seen.47 
Thus, the question that must be answered is: How can the 
judiciary continue to provide privacy protection to citizens in the 
digital age?  Interestingly enough, the Jones Court’s analysis 
suggests that the presence of technological devices may diminish 
an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy for purposes of 
defining a Fourth Amendment search.48  In its analysis, the Court 
reintroduced the old physical trespass test under the Fourth 
Amendment to ensure strong protections for individual privacy.49  
Before discussing the Court’s blended analysis under Jones, this 
44. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring) (likening
electronic intrusion to physical intrusion). 
45. Id. at 351–52 (majority opinion).
46. See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies:
Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 822
(2004) (“The ‘critical’ fact was the relationship that Katz had established when 
he occupied the phone booth, shut the door behind him, and ‘pa[id] the toll that 
permit[ted] him to place a call.’” (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., 
concurring))).  
47. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.
48. Jones, 565 U.S. at 404–05 (holding government installation of GPS
device and subsequent analysis of data constitutes Fourth Amendment search 
because government physically occupied private property to obtain 
information). 
49. See discussion of Jones, infra Section IV.B.
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Comment will first provide a background of the third-party doctrine 
and highlight the dangers of losing all Fourth Amendment 
protection if the third-party doctrine is not interpreted in a way 
that suits the digital age.  
III. THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE
An individual generally does not have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy when he or she voluntarily discloses information to a 
third party.50  As it stands, the current interpretation of the third-
party doctrine took shape after the Court’s rulings in two cases, 
United States v. Miller51 and Smith v. Maryland.52  In Miller, the 
government subpoenaed two banks where the defendant had 
accounts.53  The subpoenas required the banks to produce all of the 
defendant’s accounts, which the Court described as “negotiable 
instruments to be used in commercial transactions.”54  The 
defendant sought to suppress the bank records, arguing that the 
government conducted an unreasonable search in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment.55  The Court disagreed with the defendant’s 
argument and found that: 
The [bank] depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs 
to another, that the information will be conveyed by that 
person to the Government.  This Court has held repeatedly 
that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the 
obtaining of information revealed to a third party and 
conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the 
information is revealed on the assumption that it will be 
used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed 
in the third party will not be betrayed.56 
Three years later, in Smith v. Maryland, the Court addressed 
whether the government’s use of a pen register violated the 
50. Posadas, supra note 8, at 102; see also United States v. White, 401 U.S.
745, 751, 753 (1971) (holding government’s use of agents who themselves may 
reveal contents of conversations with an accused does not violate Fourth 
Amendment). 
51. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
52. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
53. Miller, 425 U.S. at 437.
54. Id. at 437–38, 442.
55. See id. at 438, 442.
56. Id. at 443 (citations omitted).
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defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.57  “A pen register is a 
mechanical device that records the numbers dialed on a telephone 
by monitoring the electrical impulses caused when the dial on the 
telephone is released. It does not overhear oral communications and 
does not indicate whether calls are actually completed.”58  The 
Court found, as it did in Miller, that the defendant voluntarily 
conveyed the subject information (the numbers he dialed) to a third 
party (the telephone company) when he placed his calls through an 
operator.59  The Court recognized that the phone company recorded 
the numerical information at issue “for a variety of legitimate 
business purposes.”60  Thus, when the defendant used his phone, 
“he assumed the risk that the [phone] company would reveal to 
police the numbers he dialed.”61 
In today’s technological world, scholars question whether the 
current interpretation of the third-party doctrine should be strictly 
applied.62  The doctrine creates a diminished expectation of privacy 
in information that one voluntarily shares.63  However, as the IoT 
continues to advance, the expectation of privacy established under 
the third-party doctrine constantly diminishes as a result of 
individuals losing the choice of whether to share information 
because their lives are constantly streaming through the IoT for 
commercial purposes.  Moreover, the way the government is using 
the third-party doctrine bypasses the physical trespass form of a 
search, given that no agent or officer has to physically intrude on 
an individual’s property; the government can simply obtain a court 
order or subpoena and compel the company to release the stored 
information the government seeks,64 essentially robbing 
individuals of their privacy rights.   
57. Smith, 442 U.S. at 736.
58. Id. at 736 n.1 (quoting United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 161
n.1 (1977)).
59. Id. at 743–44.
60. Id. at 743.
61. Id. at 744.
62. Lucas Issacharoff & Kyle Wirshba, Restoring Reason to the Third Party
Doctrine, 100 MINN. L. REV. 985, 987–988 (2016). 
63. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–44.
64. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012); see also Pfeifle, supra note 4 at 431
(“[I]nformation obtained from storage receives a more relaxed standard than 
information obtained in transit.”).   
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Thus, in light of technological globalization, one now assumes 
the risk that when he or she uses devices that transmit data to 
third-party companies, the information is automatically disentitled 
to Fourth Amendment protection.  Because technology is rapidly 
advancing, more guidance is needed to determine when the Fourth 
Amendment should apply.  Further, the third-party doctrine needs 
to be clearly defined to provide citizens with an understanding of 
what constitutes a reasonable expectation of privacy in data shared 
and stored on the IoT.  Hence, Part IV will discuss the Supreme 
Court’s attempt to provide some level of defense against losing 
Fourth Amendment protection in the digital age, and Part V will 
discuss statutory protection and illustrate how some forward-
thinking States are implementing law that will not allow the 
government to continue to rely on Smith, Miller, and the third-
party doctrine in the technological era. 
IV. FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS IN THE DIGITAL AGE
As technology has evolved, so has the Court’s interpretation of 
the Fourth Amendment, albeit slowly.  The two cases discussed 
below not only highlight the Court’s analysis of the Fourth 
Amendment and how it interacts with technology, but also provide 
a warning that privacy laws must be amended to suit the digital 
age.65  The Court must acclimatize its understanding and modify 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to suit the evolution of 
technology, because as it currently stands, most citizens do not feel 
they have any expectation of privacy in the digital age.66   
A. Thermal Imaging – Kyllo v. United States
In Kyllo, government agents used a thermal imaging device to
inspect the interior of the defendant’s home from a public street to 
gather evidence on the possibility that the defendant was growing 
marijuana.67  The thermal imaging device used by the government 
“detect[s] infrared radiation, which virtually all objects emit but 
65. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012); Kyllo v. United States, 
533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
66. See Cameron F. Kerry, Why Protecting Privacy is a Losing Game
Today—And How to Change the Game, BROOKINGS (July 12, 2018) 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/why-protecting-privacy-is-a-losing-game-
today-and-how-to-change-the-game/ [https://perma.cc/ZN3A-THSB].  
67. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29–30.
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which is not visible by the naked eye . . . [and] converts [that] 
radiation into images based on relative warmth . . . operat[ing] 
somewhat like a video camera showing heat images.”68  The scan 
revealed that some portions of Kyllo’s home were warmer than 
others, and significantly warmer than his neighbors’ homes.69  The 
Court held that when the government, even from a public 
viewpoint, “obtain[s] by sense-enhancing technology any 
information regarding the interior of the home that could not 
otherwise be obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a 
constitutionally protected area’ . . . a search [has occurred]—at least 
where (as here) the technology in question is not in general public 
use.”70 
The aspect of Kyllo most relevant to this discussion is that the 
Court found that technology has decreased the level of protection 
the Fourth Amendment provides.71  However, the Court concluded 
by clearly stating that there is a high level of protection when 
dealing with searches of a person’s home: “We have said that the 
Fourth Amendment draws ‘a firm line at the entrance to the house,’ 
[and] [t]hat line, we think, must be not only firm but also bright—
which requires clear specification of those methods of surveillance 
that require a warrant.”72  Hence, the government’s activity being 
deemed a Fourth Amendment search was not contingent on the 
level of intimacy of the information actually collected through 
sense-enhancing technology, but rather that all details of the home 
are considered intimate for the purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment.73  The Court undoubtedly provides a high level of 
protection to all activities that take place in the home. 
68. Id. at 30–31.
69. Id. at 30.
70. Id. at 34 (citations omitted) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365
U.S. 505, 512 (1961)).  
71. See id. at 33–34.
72. Id. at 40 (citation omitted) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,
590 (1980)). 
73. See id. at 37–38.  The government argued that the Court could develop
a rule that would limit the prohibition of thermal imaging to “intimate details”; 
however, the Court found that argument not only wrong in principle but 
impractical.  Id. at 38.  The use of thermal vision would allow the government 
to see not only any illegal activity but all activities; for example, the Court 
noted that the use of thermal imaging could detect when the “lady of the house” 
takes a bath—a detail that many would consider intimate.  Id.  
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However, even though Kyllo clearly provides a high level of 
Fourth Amendment protection in the home, the Court has not 
provided a solution for citizens to continue enjoying the same level 
of privacy in the wake of the digital age.  Kyllo’s holding leaves open 
the possibility that one’s privacy rights will shrink as technology 
advances given that a substantial amount of what the government 
utilizes to gather information is available to the general public.  For 
example, thermal imaging devices are now at the fingertips of most 
citizens; the government can accordingly argue that they no longer 
intrude on an individual’s constitutionally protected right because 
of the public’s newfound access to thermal-imaging technology.74  
Thus, in order to maintain Fourth Amendment protection in the 
digital age, the Court must overturn in part Kyllo’s holding.  
B. GPS Tracking Devices – United States v. Jones
In Jones, the government placed Antoine Jones, a nightclub
owner and operator, under investigation for the alleged trafficking 
of narcotics.75  Based on the government’s investigation, the FBI 
applied for a warrant authorizing the placement of a Global 
Positioning System (GPS) tracking device on Jones’s automobile.76  
Once obtained, the FBI placed the GPS tracking device on the 
undercarriage of Jones’s vehicle and monitored its movement 
twenty-four hours a day for approximately twenty-eight days.77  
During the period Jones’s vehicle was monitored, the FBI collected 
more than 2,000 pages of data detailing the vehicle’s location.78   
However, the warrant as implemented was invalid,79 so the 
Court had to considered whether the government’s actions 
amounted to a Fourth Amendment search and thus whether a 




FS78-WUMF] (last visited on Oct. 25, 2019). 
75. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 402 (2012).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 402–03.
78. Id. at 403.
79. See id. at 402–403. (“A warrant [was] issued, authorizing installation
of the [GPS] device in the District of Columbia . . . within 10 days.  On the 11th 
day, and not in the District of Columbia but in Maryland, agents installed a 
GPS tracking device on the undercarriage of the Jeep . . . .”). 
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warrant was even required.80  The Court held that the attachment 
of a GPS device to a vehicle, “and subsequent use of that device to 
monitor the vehicle’s movements,” constituted a search under the 
Fourth Amendment.81  Interestingly, Justice Scalia focused his 
analysis on the government’s physical trespass, rather than Jones’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy.82  The majority did not disturb 
the reasonable expectation of privacy test defined in Katz.83   
Prior to Jones, Fourth Amendment analysis of the same issue 
would have focused solely on whether the individual had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, which could have led to a 
different outcome.84  Jones instead provided the courts with an 
alternative means of establishing a Fourth Amendment search; 
that is, by showing a governmental intrusion of a protected 
property interest.85  Given that the reasonable expectation of 
privacy analysis relies in part on objective means—an expectation 
of privacy that society is willing to accept as reasonable—it seems 
that Justice Scalia recognized that the prevalence of technological 
devices would in fact diminish objective expectations of privacy and 
thus reintroduced the property-based approach to Fourth 
Amendment search analysis.  
The concurring Justices in Jones agreed that there was a 
Fourth Amendment search, but on different grounds.86  Justice 
Sotomayor’s concurrence is particularly notable because she 
explicitly stated that the time has come to revisit and alter the 
third-party doctrine as it applies in the digital age: 
More fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider the 
premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation 
of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third 
80. See id. at 404–05.
81. Id. at 402.
82. See id. at 411.
83. Id.
84. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (“A person
traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy.”).   
85. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 406–07.
86. Id. at 413, 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (accepting the majority’s
property-based approach but also arguing that the long-term use of the GPS 
would indeed violate the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy); id. at 
419 (Alito, J., concurring) (agreeing a Fourth Amendment search occurred, but 
arguing that the Court should have analyzed the case using the Katz test).  
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parties.  This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in 
which people reveal a great deal of information about 
themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out 
mundane tasks.  People disclose the phone numbers that 
they dial or text to their cellular providers; the URLs that 
they visit and the e-mail addresses with which they 
correspond to their Internet service providers; and the 
books, groceries, and medications they purchase to online 
retailers. . . . I for one doubt that people would accept 
without complaint the warrantless disclosure to the 
government of a list of every Web site they had visited in 
the last week, or month, or year.87 
Justice Sotomayor argued that Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence should stop treating secrecy as a requirement for 
privacy.88  “[One] would not assume that all information 
voluntarily disclosed to some member of the public for a limited 
purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment 
protection.”89  Justice Sotomayor contended that the third-party 
doctrine, as it stands now, is unsuitable for a digital world.90  Her 
position becomes more relevant as the IoT continues to grow—as 
more devices monitor one’s activities, an individual’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy will eventually cease to exist. 
V. FEDERAL PRIVACY LAWS FAIL IN THE IOT
As Fourth Amendment jurisprudence evolved, Congress 
realized that advancing technology could lead to potential 
inconsistencies in applying this developing area of law.91  
Congress’s concern of advancing technology prompted it to 
commission its Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) to provide 
guidance regarding how the Fourth Amendment should apply as 
technology progressed.92  In 1985, the OTA generated a report 
87. Id. at 417–18 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
88. Id. at 418.
89. Id. (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351–52 (1967)). 
90. Id. at 417.
91. Allegra Bianchini, Note, Always On, Always Listening: Navigating
Fourth Amendment Rights in a Smart Home, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. ARGUENDO
1, 16 (2018). 
92. Id.
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concluding that privacy protection was “weak, ambiguous, or 
nonexistent,” despite Supreme Court guidance.93  Based on the 
findings of the OTA’s report, Congress enacted the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) to address the lack of Fourth 
Amendment protection caused by the third-party doctrine.94 
As a subsection of the ECPA, Congress enacted the Stored 
Communications Act (SCA), which was premised on the theory that 
the proprietary interest of information should not change based 
solely upon a third-party service provider electronically storing that 
information rather than the owner.95  Electronic storage means 
“any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic 
communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof;” 
and “any storage of such communication by an electronic 
communication service for purposes of backup protection of such 
communication.”96  As this Comment will illustrate below, the 
SCA’s protections are inadequate in the face of a modern 
technological world.97   
A. Rules of Compelled Disclosure by the Government
The SCA was promulgated to maintain an individual’s
reasonable expectation of privacy even where communications are 
stored with a service provider despite the third-party doctrine.98  
However, one component of the SCA, “compelled disclosure,” allows 
the government to obtain data stored with a service provider 
without a warrant in certain situations.99  Whether the government 
needs a warrant, or a mere court order or subpoena, depends on the 
level of protection the stored information is afforded.100  The SCA 
determines the level of protection afforded to stored information by 
93. Id. (quoting OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., OTA-CIT-293, 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY: ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 
AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 45 (1985)). 
94. Id at 17.
95. Id.
96. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17) (2012).
97. Bianchini, supra note 91, at 17–18.
98. Orin S. Kerr, Lifting the “Fog” of Internet Surveillance: How a
Suppression Remedy Would Change Computer Crime Law, 54 HASTINGS L.J.
805, 816 (2003).   
99. 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012); see also Kerr, supra note 98, at 816.
100. See § 2703 (a)–(b).
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classifying it based on three distinct categories: the type of service 
provided, the type of information sought, and the length of time for 
which the information is stored.101   
1. Electronic Communications Service v. Remote Computing
Service
Under the SCA, a provider can either be an Electronic 
Communications Service (ECS), which provides its users “the 
ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications” or a 
Remote Computing Service (RCS), which provides its users online 
“storage or processing services.”102 Determining the service 
provider’s designation is not based on the provider’s status in the 
abstract, but rather the provider’s interaction with a particular 
communication; a given provider can be classified as an ECS at one 
point and an RCS at another.103  For example, when someone sends 
an electronic communication to another, the provider is an ECS 
until the message is opened.104  If the recipient of the information 
decides to save the message for future reference, then the same 
provider is now acting as an RCS in storing that communication.105  
A court’s classification is important because an ECS provider is 
afforded more protection than an RCS provider.106 
2. Content v. Non–Content
The second category is based upon what type of information the
government wants to obtain—content or non-content.107  “Content” 
is the information in the communication that one intends to share 
101. § 2703; Bianchini, supra note 91, at 18; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (2012)
(providing rules that govern when an Internet Service Provider (ISP) can 
voluntarily disclose information to the government).  
102. See Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act,
and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1214 
(2004) (quoting 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510(15), 2711(2)).   
103. Eric R. Hinz, A Distinctionless Distinction: Why the RCS/ECS
Distinction in the Stored Communications Act Does Not Work, 88 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 489, 496 (2012).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See id. at 500–01 (illustrating the fact that RCS is afforded a lower
threshold of protection). 
107. See Bianchini, supra note 91, at 18.
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with another.108  The body of the message in an email would be 
considered the “content.”109  In contrast, “non-content,” also 
referred to as metadata, is what the provider uses to deliver and 
process the communication.110  For example, the name and email 
address of the recipient would be considered “non-content” 
information.111  The SCA provides greater protection to “content” 
information because messages intended for a certain recipient 
implicate greater privacy concerns.112 
3. Time in Storage
The third category is based on the amount of time that a
communication is stored.113  Communications stored for 180 or 
fewer days and those stored longer than 180 days are provided 
different levels of protection.114  For example, if a communication 
that is considered “content” (unopened email)115 is held within an 
ECS for 100 days, the government must obtain a warrant pursuant 
to section 2703(a) of the SCA to access that data.116  However, if 
that same communication is stored longer than 180 days, then the 
government need only obtain a court order or subpoena pursuant to 
section 2703(d).117 
B. Rules of Compelled Disclosure Fail in an IoT World
A court’s characterization of  information under the SCA will
dictate how the government can compel disclosure of that 
information.118  The only time the government must obtain a 
warrant is when an ECS provider stores “content” information that 
108. Kerr, supra note 102, at 1228.
109. Bianchini, supra note 91, at 18.
110. Kerr, supra note 102, at 1228.
111. Bianchini, supra note 91, at 18.
112. See Kerr, supra note 102, at 1228.
113. See Christina Raquel, Blue Skies Ahead: Clearing the Air for
Information Privacy in the Cloud, 55 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 467, 485 (2015).  
114. See id.
115. See Kerr, supra note 102, at 1216 (“[W]hen an e-mail customer leaves
a copy of an already-accessed e-mail stored on a server, that copy is no longer 
‘incident to transmission’ . . . rather, it is just in remote storage like any other 
file held by an RCS.”). 
116. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2012).
117. Id.
118. See Bianchini, supra note 91, at 18.
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is held for fewer than 180 days; in all other instances, the 
government need only obtain a subpoena or court order to obtain 
the sought-after information.119  If that fact is not chilling enough, 
technology has advanced to a point where these simple rules, which 
appear to favor the government, have become blurred.   
In today’s technological society, service providers can perform 
the functions of an ECS and RCS simultaneously,120 and 
distinctions between “content” and “non-content” information have 
become unclear.121  For example, if providers can perform ECS and 
RCS functions simultaneously, then the government can classify 
the provider as an RCS and simply obtain a court order pursuant 
to section 2703(d), or provide the customer notice and subpoena the 
information; the government can delay notice up to ninety days, 
however, if notification would have adverse results.122  Moreover, 
the government may forego attempting to obtain “content” 
information given that “non-content” data can now reveal intimate 
details about our lives; according to NSA’s former general counsel, 
Stewart Baker, “[m]etadata absolutely tells you everything about 
somebody’s life.”123 
As a result, the SCA fails to provide the level of protection 
needed from government intrusion, especially in an IoT world 
where a third-party provider will constantly stream and store one’s 
private information.  Although new statutes and case law are 
recognizing the need for more privacy protection in the digital age, 
the legislature and judiciary are failing to keep up with 
advancements in technology.124  
119. See Hinz, supra note 103, at 501.  The standard for a court order is
much lower than the probable cause standard needed for a warrant.  See 
§ 2703(d) (“A court order for disclosure . . . shall issue only if the governmental
entity offers specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic communication . . .
are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”).
120. Bianchini, supra note 91, at 18.
121. See id. at 19; Kerr, supra note 102, at 1227–28 (discussing the
difficulties in distinguishing “content” from “non-content” information). 
122. See Hinz, supra note 103, at 501; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2705(a)(2) (2012)
(providing the ways in which the government may delay notice because of an 
“adverse result”).   
123. LAURA K. DONOHUE, THE FUTURE OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE: PRIVACY
AND SURVEILLANCE IN A DIGITAL AGE 39 (2016).  
124. See California Electronic Communications Privacy Act, CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1546.1 (West 2017).  This statute mandates that the government obtain 
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VI. PIERCING THE ARMOR OF THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE – THE
SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN UNITED STATES V. CARPENTER
In Riley v. California, the Court held that a warrantless search 
of a cell phone was not reasonable, even where the cell phone was 
seized from the defendant’s body incident to arrest.125  The Court 
reasoned that a cell phone required heightened protection given the 
amount of data that can be stored on each device; that is, cell 
phones can contain essentially every facet of an individual’s life.126  
The Riley decision was appealing because the Court appeared to 
signal its recognition that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
needed adjusting to accommodate a digital world.  There is a 
significant amount of language in the Court’s decision that suggests 
Riley is just “the tip of the iceberg” because “[w]e’re now in a ‘digital 
age’ and quantity of data and the ‘qualitatively different’ nature of 
at least some digital records changes how the Fourth Amendment 
a warrant and particularly describe the electronic communication the 
government intends to search, and requires the government to provide notice 
to the target of the warrant.  Id.  Furthermore, the statute provides protection 
to many more companies given the statute’s broad definition of “service 
provider.”  Id. § 1546(j).  However, when information is sent without human 
involvement (as it does with the Amazon Edge), when and how information 
becomes an electronic communication is unclear.  Because the definition of a 
“service provider” is dependent on whether it provides the user the ability to 
send or receive electronic communications, the government can still argue its 
away around the warrant requirement.  Id.; Pfeifle, supra note 4 at 434–37.  
For other examples of attempts to provide consumers with greater protection, 
see, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-5-601 to -605 (West 2017) (requiring the 
government to obtain a warrant prior to compelling a provider to disclose a 
user’s communication, but still allowing the government to prevent providers 
from notifying its customers of the disclosure); United States v. Warshak, 631 
F.3d 266, 284, 286–87 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that a user has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in their email, and concluding that even where a user
agrees to provide the user’s internet service provider (ISP) with access to their
emails, that is not enough to defeat Fourth Amendment protections).
125. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 386 (2014).
126. Id. at 393 (“The term ‘cell phone’ is itself misleading . . . many of these
devices are in fact minicomputers that also happen to have the capacity to be 
used as a telephone. . . . One of the most notable distinguishing features of 
modern cell phones is their immense storage capacity.”).  
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should apply.”127  Nevertheless, the Court limited its ruling to cases 
that involve a search incident to arrest.128  
The Court answered the question regarding aggregated digital 
information in United States v. Carpenter.129  The majority opinion, 
authored by Chief Justice Roberts—who also authored Riley—held 
that a cell phone user has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
cell phone’s geolocation data.130  The Court focused on guideposts 
created by prior case law, specifically how the Fourth Amendment 
seeks to secure “‘the privacies of life’ against ‘arbitrary power’”131 
and “to place obstacles in the way of a too permeating police 
surveillance.”132  
Prior to Carpenter, the government could compel cell phone 
carriers under the SCA to turn over a user’s cell-site location 
information (CSLI) whenever it could offer “‘specific and articulable 
facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe’ that the 
records sought ‘are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal 
investigation.’”133 CSLI is generated from cell phones sending 
signals to and from “cell sites,” which are radio antennas mounted 
on “tower[s] . . . light posts, flag poles, church steeples, or the sides 
of buildings.”134  Whenever a cell phone user sends or receives a 
text, phone call, or uses data, that individual creates CSLI.135  Most 
notably, the SCA’s requirement for the government to obtain a 
user’s CSLI is a lower standard than the probable cause standard 
required for warrants.   
In 2011, the police arrested four men suspected in a string of 
robberies in Detroit, Michigan.136  One of the men confessed to all 
of the robberies and provided officers with his call records from the 
127. Orin S. Kerr, The Significance of Riley, WASH. POST: VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (June 25, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2014/06/25/the-significance-of riley/ [https://perma.cc/5FLN-
7RRT].  
128. Riley, 573 U.S. at 395 n.1.
129. United States v. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211 (2018).
130. Id. at 2219.
131. Id. at 2214 (quoting Boyd v. United States 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1986)).
132. Id. (quoting United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948)).
133. Id. at 2212 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d)).
134. Id. at 2211.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 2212.
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time of the robberies, a list of suspects, and their phone numbers.137  
Armed with that information, “the prosecutors applied for court 
orders under the Stored Communications Act to obtain cell phone 
records for petitioner Timothy Carpenter and several other 
suspects.”138  Federal magistrate judges granted the prosecutors’ 
requests and ordered MetroPCS and Sprint, two wireless carriers 
with whom Carpenter had accounts, to disclose CSLI for the 
“origination and . . . termination [of] incoming and outgoing calls” 
to Carpenter’s cell phone during the period in which the robberies 
occurred.139  As a result, “the Government obtained 12,898 location 
points cataloging Carpenter’s movements—an average of 101 data 
points per day.”140  With that information, the government was able 
to show that Carpenter was present at several of the crimes scenes 
at the times during which the robberies occurred.141  After 
presenting this information at trial, Carpenter was convicted on all 
but one count and received a sentence of more than 100 years in 
prison.142   
Following his conviction, Carpenter appealed to the Sixth 
Circuit.143  The Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court and held that 
“Carpenter lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
location information collected by the FBI because he shared that 
information with his wireless carriers.”144  The Sixth Circuit 
concluded that because “cell phone users voluntarily convey cell-
site data to their carriers as ‘a means of establishing 
communication,’” the CSLI is not entitled to Fourth Amendment 
protection.145  Carpenter then filed for a petition of certiorari, 





141. Id. at 2212–13.
142. Id. at 2213.
143. See id.
144. Id.
145. Id. (quoting United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 888 (6th Cir.
2016)). 
146. Id.
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Carpenter is a unique case given that the majority recognized 
something “qualitatively different” in the digital data at issue.147  
Chief Justice Roberts created a unique exception because he saw 
government acquisition of CSLI as sitting “at the intersection of two 
lines of cases, both of which inform our understanding of the 
privacy interest at stake.”148  The first line of cases “addresses a 
person’s expectation of privacy in his physical location and 
movements.”149  The second set of cases relies on the third-party 
doctrine of Smith and Miller where Chief Justice Roberts wrote, 
“the Court has drawn a line between what a person keeps to himself 
and what he shares with others . . . [maintaining] that ‘a person has 
no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily 
turns over to third parties.’”150 However, unlike precedent 
illustrating the Court’s concern over technology diminishing one’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy, Chief Justice Roberts—instead 
of reevaluating Fourth Amendment jurisprudence—took a novel 
approach and applied both lines of precedent to CSLI, balancing 
one’s reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements against 
one providing his movements to a third-party.  
Chief Justice Roberts found that the government invaded 
Carpenter’s reasonable expectation of privacy in his physical 
movements when it accessed CSLI from Carpenter’s wireless 
carrier.151 In the Court’s opinion, Chief Justice Roberts accounted 
for the advancement in a wireless carrier’s capability to pinpoint an 
individual’s location, the private nature of a person’s movements 
and the sensitive information it may reveal, and the ability of the 
government “to retrace a person’s whereabouts” which was subject 
only to a wireless carrier’s five-year retention policy.152  Chief 
Justice Roberts then weighed his findings against the third-party 
doctrine concerns of Smith and Miller.153  He found that when 
looking at “the nature of the particular documents sought” to 
147. Id. at 2216–17.
148. Id. at 2214–15.
149. Id. at 2215.  Chief Justice Roberts cited to United States v. Knotts, 460
U.S. 276 (1983) and United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) for the stated 
proposition.  Id.  
150. Id. at 2216 (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979)).
151. Id. at 2219.
152. Id. at 2218.
153. See id. at 2219–20.
2020] FOURTH AMENDMENT 141 
determine whether “there is a legitimate ‘expectation of privacy’ 
concerning their contents . . . the Government fail[ed] to appreciate 
that there [were] no comparable limitations on the revealing nature 
of CSLI.”154  CSLI, which is “a detailed chronicle of a person’s 
physical presence compiled every day, every moment, over several 
years . . . implicates privacy concerns far beyond those considered 
in Smith and Miller.”155 
Chief Justice Roberts correctly recognized that the voluntary 
disclosure rationale of the third party doctrine does not make sense 
in the CSLI context.156  CSLI “is not truly ‘shared’ as one normally 
understands the term,” since the “sharing” occurs automatically 
“without any affirmative act on the part of the user beyond 
powering up [his cell phone].”157  More importantly, Carpenter 
illustrated the fact that there are many digital applications from 
which the government could obtain copious amounts of data about 
an individual.158  Instead of finding that the third-party doctrine 
should not apply in a digital world given that “people often do 
reasonably expect that information they entrust to third parties . . . 
will be kept private,”159 the majority created a balancing test where 
courts must assign value to different categories of information and 
weigh the individual’s privacy rights in that information against a 
third-party disclosure.  Thus, the Court dispelled the notion that a 
person never has an expectation of privacy in digital information 
held by third parties.160 
VII.THE ANSWER TO FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE IN THE 
DIGITAL AGE – THE “ADHESION BAILMENT DOCTRINE” 
As Chief Justice Roberts noted in Carpenter, Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence is at a crossroad regarding the third-
154. Id. at 2219 (quoting United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976)).
155. Id. at 2220.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. See id. at 2262 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 2263.
160. See id. at 2263, 2267.  “[I]f the third party doctrine is supposed to
represent a normative assessment of when a person should expect privacy [in 
information conveyed to third parties], the notion that the answer might be 
‘never’ seems a pretty unattractive societal prescription.”  Id. at 2263.  
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party doctrine and advanced digital technology.161  In an IoT world, 
a user’s profile is created simply from that user completing 
everyday mundane tasks.162  Thus, courts are left to determine 
whether the user-generated profiles are voluntarily conveyed, 
whether the information is of a type that deserves Fourth 
Amendment protection, and how strong the government’s interests 
are in obtaining the user’s information—a daunting task.  Aside 
from some innovative state legislation and a novel approach that 
would provide an IoT user with enhanced privacy protection within 
their home, society remains in limbo as its reasonable expectation 
of privacy continues to diminish in the digital age.163  This 
Comment attempts to provide a more comprehensive solution, 
drawing from Justice Gorsuch’s dissenting opinion in Carpenter.  
Justice Gorsuch proposed a pre-Katz approach that deals with 
problems of modern technology.  The basis of his idea was simple 
and drew from the language of the Fourth Amendment: “[T]he 
traditional approach asked if a house, paper or effect was yours 
under law. No more was needed to trigger the Fourth 
Amendment.”164  There are several advantages of using that kind 
of property-based approach.  Judges will have a much easier time 
navigating the issues of the third-party doctrine as that approach 
would remove from the judge “their own personal policy 
preferences” about the reasonableness of one’s expectation of 
privacy and allow for “legislative participation in the Fourth 
161. See id. at 2215–16.
162. See supra Part I.
163. Supra text accompanying note 122; see Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The
Internet of Things and the Fourth Amendment of Effects, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 
805, 866–87 (2016) (providing the theory of “Digital Curtilage”).  Digital 
Curtilage is a concept that is applied much like the traditional protection one 
receives from the physical curtilage that surrounds a home.  Id.  Essentially, 
digital curtilage would include IoT devices that are connected in the home and 
that communicate information that flows from the home to third-party 
providers.  Id.  Thus, once an IoT device is connected to a home network, the 
third-party doctrine should apply given the all-inclusive and intimate nature 
of the information contained within.  Id.  Although this approach would provide 
sufficient protection in an IoT user’s home, the issue is that IoT devices compile 
data on users even when the user is traveling outside the home, such as 
shopping at the mall, parking a car, or ordering food.  Thus, a stronger, more 
holistic approach is needed to provide an IoT user with adequate protection 
regardless of whether the individual is in the home.   
164. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2267–68.
2020] FOURTH AMENDMENT 143 
Amendment context.”165  Most importantly, “Fourth Amendment 
protections for your papers and effects do not automatically 
disappear just because you share them with third parties.”166   
Justice Gorsuch realized the prominent effect Katz has had on 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and that courts would need help 
to reapply the traditional approach to the Fourth Amendment. 
However, he acknowledged that more work is needed to resuscitate 
this area of law before his theory could be fully implemented, and 
thus offered multiple thoughts for guidance.167  One of his chief 
thoughts was his proposal to use bailments as a way of addressing 
third-party doctrine issues.168  
“A bailment is the ‘delivery of personal property by one person 
(the bailor) to another (the bailee) who holds the property for a 
certain purpose.”169  A bailee has a legal obligation to keep the item 
or thing safe, and to use it in accordance with the agreed upon 
intended purpose, or otherwise the bailee could face legal 
consequences.170  Justice Gorsuch cements his theory of bailments 
in the traditional Fourth Amendment precedent of Ex parte 
Jackson,171 where the Court wrote: “The constitutional guaranty of 
the right of the people to be secure in their papers against 
unreasonable searches and seizures extends to their papers, thus 
closed against inspection, wherever they may be.”172  Justice 
Gorsuch also opined that “[j]ust because you entrust your data—in 
some cases, your modern-day papers and effects—to a third party 
may not mean you lose any Fourth Amendment interest in its 
contents.”173  Justice Gorsuch provides a foundation on which this 
165. See id. at 2268.
166. Id.
167. See id. at 2268–71.
168. Id. at 2268–69.
169. Id. at 2268 (quoting Bailment, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed.
2014)) (citing JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF BAILMENTS, § 2, at 
2 (1832)). 
170. See id. at 2268–69.
171. 96 U.S. 727 (1878). This Court held that sealed letters placed in the
mail are “as fully guarded from examination and inspection, except as to their 
outward form and weight, as if they were retained by the parties forwarding 
them in their own domiciles.”  Id. at 733.  
172. Id.
173. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2269.  An example of a bailment would be when 
an individual gives his car keys to a valet at a restaurant; that individual 
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Comment builds its theory of the “adhesion bailment.”  The 
“adhesion bailment doctrine” is premised on fairness and provides 
enhanced protection to the individual IoT user.  Courts can use 
bailments as a way to clarify what privacy protection an IoT user 
maintains.   
There are two ways one can view a service provider as a 
bailee.174  The first is viewing a third-party company as an 
intermediary, i.e., a bailee, who is provided the information to 
perform a task, rather than as the “recipient” of the information. 
For example, when one uses an IoT device such as an Amazon Echo 
and asks it to send an email, Amazon, the third-party company, is 
not the recipient of that information.  The IoT user is “voluntarily” 
sending that information to Amazon, and even though Amazon may 
store the information for business purposes, Amazon’s main 
function is to take that information and deliver it to the actual 
intended recipient.  Thus, just as a mail carrier cannot consent to 
the disclosure of the contents of the letter she is delivering, Amazon 
cannot consent to the disclosure of the contents of the email. 
Furthermore, the government’s argument that the IoT user does 
not have exclusive control or complete ownership over the 
information should be rejected.  If anything, the opposite principle 
is reflected in American jurisprudence, as tenants who rent an 
apartment and family members who do not own legal title to their 
home “still have standing to complain about searches of the houses 
in which they live.”175  Therefore, IoT users who voluntarily provide 
data to a third-party company as a bailee, or in an intermediary 
capacity, should maintain Fourth Amendment protection in that 
information.  
The second way to view a third-party company as a bailee is 
through the proposed “adhesion bailment doctrine.”176 This 
doctrine provides greater protection to the IoT user than the 
current regime and is premised on inherent fairness.  As noted 
above, society is coming to a point where the IoT will constantly 
gather data on all individuals.  By merely living in an IoT world, 
knows that he will get his keys and vehicle back at the end of his meal.  Id. at 
2268. 
174. See id. at 2268–69.  This paragraph draws from Justice Gorsuch’s
theory on bailments and applies it practically in the IoT world. 
175. Id. at 2269–70.
176. The “adhesion bailment doctrine” is based on this author’s own theory.
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one is continuously providing data to a third party; it is difficult to 
understand how anyone can honestly state that such information is 
voluntarily conveyed.  The third-party doctrine is predicated on an 
individual voluntarily providing information to another. 
Accordingly, the “adhesion bailment doctrine” is triggered when a 
third-party company collects data on individuals through means of 
the user’s day-to-day activities—essentially, the user will 
automatically have Fourth Amendment protection in the 
information third-party companies collect through the user’s daily 
routine. The fact that the information collected from third-party 
companies from IoT users is not voluntarily disclosed is the central 
part of the reasoning why the term “adhesion” is used in this 
doctrine’s name.  Thus, regardless of how advanced technology 
becomes, the user’s privacy rights will always remain intact.   
For example, in the IoT, the government could obtain a 
subpoena for the records of a conversation an individual had while 
sitting in front of his television at home, not realizing the TV was 
recording him. The government could also obtain one’s 
conversations and whereabouts while driving a vehicle because 
many cars have emergency communications hardware installed, 
similar to OnStar technology.  In more advanced cities, sensors are 
placed in many objects, such as recycling bins.  As one passes by, 
the sensor can track the Wi-Fi signals from passing phones, giving 
the government an individual’s location at any given time.  These 
examples highlight only a few ways the government can use the IoT 
to investigate individuals.  If courts followed the “adhesion 
bailment doctrine,” any attempt by the government to obtain the 
type of data described would trigger Fourth Amendment protection 
to the IoT user.  Therefore, the government would have to establish 
probable cause and either obtain a warrant or show a recognized 
exception to the warrant requirement to receive any information 
stored with the third-party companies.  This solution provides 
ample protection to the IoT user by prohibiting the government 
from using the current interpretation of the third-party doctrine to 
obtain sensitive personal information without probable cause—the 
standard required according to the Constitution.177 
177. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause . . . .”). 
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CONCLUSION 
Federal law and jurisprudence regarding digital privacy has 
not responded to advancements in technology quickly enough.  
Although some state legislatures have attempted to create more 
privacy protection for individuals, those laws are still lacking, and 
more importantly, they only protect the individuals of the 
respective state.  Additionally, current legislation and common law 
are continuing to provide the government with backdoor access 
around an individual’s Fourth Amendment protection through the 
use of the third-party doctrine.  Nevertheless, if the third-party 
doctrine is abandoned, it will likely be replaced with something that 
is more complicated, or at least more nuanced, than its predecessor. 
Thus, until workable law is created that will balance the need of 
government investigation and individual privacy protection of 
digital data, the third-party doctrine will remain.  Accordingly, this 
Comment’s proposed doctrine of adhesion bailments provides 
protection to the individual IoT user, and at the same time, does 
not alter the interpretation of the third-party doctrine.  Although 
the government will not have the power it currently possesses in 
the digital age, it can still use the third-party doctrine in limited 
respects, creating a workable balance between governmental 
intrusion and protection of individual privacy. Of course, the 
government can continue to conduct investigations as it has prior 
to the advancement of technology—through adherence to the 
Fourth Amendment.  However, even though this Comment 
proposes a way of maintaining an individual’s privacy rights in the 
digital age, the overwhelming theme is that technology is always 
advancing.  Today witnesses the IoT, tomorrow might see artificial 
intelligence, and what else the future holds, no one knows.  Thus, 
the Fourth Amendment must be adaptable to an ever-changing 
society.  
